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1 Introduction
Stability is a highly desirable property for political systems. The modeling
of political interactions has to take this stability requirement into account.
In coalitional models, stability is defined as the possibility of achieving, for
any preference profile, a state that no coalition would oppose. In strate-
gic models, this amounts to the existence, for any preference profile, of an
equilibrium (solvability). However it is commonly known that most political
systems are unstable in this sense. In mathematical social sciences, results
known as impossibility theorems reflect the fact that stability (or solvabil-
ity) is rather hard to obtain. Therefore it is interesting to investigate the
properties of unstable mechanisms.
Although this investigation can be carried out in a far more general
setting (see Abdou and Keiding (2003) for the general notion of effectiv-
ity structure), we shall focus in this study on the so-called local effectivity
functions. While effectivity functions appear naturally in the study of imple-
mentation theory (Moulin and Peleg, 1982; Peleg and Winter, 2002; Peleg,
2004; Peleg and Peters, 2008), as well as in the theory of Constitutions
and Rights (Peleg, 1998), local effectivity functions are closely related to
the solvability problem (Abdou, 1995, 2000). In their investigation of game
form solvability (e.g. for Nash or strong Nash equilibrium), Abdou and Kei-
ding (2003) pointed out two new aspects regarding the power distribution:
(1) the dependence of this power on the current state (the local aspect), (2)
the joint character of the interactive power (the interactive aspect). In this
paper we limit ourselves to the local aspect only, but instead of deriving our
object from a strategic game form, we define it abstractly. Like an effectiv-
ity function, a local effectivity function describes the power of coalitions to
achieve an outcome in some subsets of alternatives, but unlike an effectivity
function, this power may depend on the current state. Our choice to restrict
our attention on this object is justified by its simplicity, its natural interpre-
tation and the elegance of the properties involved in its analysis. However
and despite this restriction, the local aspect adds an original ingredient and
reveals new properties that cannot be articulated if we limit the study to
effectivity functions. Stability of local effectivity functions is defined as the
non-vacuity of the core for all preference profiles.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of local effectivity func-
tions may be deduced as a particular case of stability of effectivity structures
(Abdou and Keiding, 2003, Theorem 6) and therefore, they are not the cen-
tral question of this article. Here our main objective is to further investigate,
what can be said when the local effectivity function is unstable. The notion
of cycle lies at the heart of stability characterization. This fact, known
since Condorcet, turns out to be very general. A cycle (definition 3.1) is a
sequence of potential objections that obeys a combinatorial property that
guarantees their compatibility. The existence of a cycle is equivalent to the
2
existence of some profile for which any potential state is opposed by some
coalition. Therefore, to study instability we must explore the structure of
cycles.
As a first step in our investigation of instability, we introduce a stability
index defined precisely as the mimimal length of all possible cycles (+∞ in
case of stability). This number does not exhaust all the features of instability
of a local effectivity function, but does provide a meaningful classification
of instability types. If the cardinal of the alternative set is p, the stability
index can be any integer between 2 and p. In this paper we identify the
index of some subclasses of local effectivity functions. In the case of simple
games, our index can be viewed as the analog of the Nakamura number
(Nakamura, 1979). Indeed, when the stability index is finite then it coincides
with the Nakamura number (Corollary 4.5). The second class for which
we determine the stability index is that of maximal effectivity functions
(Theorem 4.7). This is done by checking classical properties: regularity,
superadditivity and subadditivity. Our method for the general case consists
in extracting two appropriate effectivity functions from the local effectivity
function, and to check whether they coincide. When this is the case, the
local effectivity function is said to be exact. Again, in the class of maximal
local effectivity functions, we can determine the stability index: by checking
exactness and classical properties of effectivity functions (Theorem 4.13). It
is remarkable that for maximal effectivity functions and indeed for maximal
local effectivity functions, the stability index is either 2 or 3.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, local effectivity functions
and related concepts are defined. Cycles are the main object of Section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to the study of the stability index. Its relationship to the
Nakamura number is established in Subsection 4.1. The determination of the
stability index of maximal effectivity functions is the object of Subsection
4.2 and that of maximal local effectivity functions is the object of Subsection
4.3. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
In this section we define a model of interaction that specifies the power
distribution of a set of agents over some set of alternatives, with no explicit
reference to any strategic mechanism that gives rise to that power. We
shall see later (definition 2.5) how, starting from a strategic mechanism
(i.e. a game form) one can derive an appropriate description of the power
distribution induced by the strategies. The notions that we present in this
section, have in common that only the independent power held by coalitions
is represented. They are encompassed by the concept of local effectivity
function. We shall see that the latter includes, as particular cases, effectivity
functions and simple games.
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2.1 Basic notations
Throughout this paper we shall consider a finite set N , the elements of
which are called players or agents and a finite set A, the elements of which
are called alternatives or states. We make use of the following notational
conventions: For any set D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets of D
and by P0(D) = P(D)\{∅} the set of all non-empty subsets of D. Elements
of P0(N) are called coalitions. N\S is denoted S
c. Similarly if B ∈ P(A),
A\B is denoted Bc. L(A) will denote the set of all linear orders on A (that is
all binary relations on A which are complete, transitive, and antisymmetric).
If R ∈ L(A), and a, b ∈ A, a 6= b, a R b means that a is better than b in
the linear order R. A preference profile (over A) is a map from N to L(A),
so that a preference profile is an element of L(A)N . For every preference
profile RN ∈ L(A)
N and S ∈ P0(N) we put
P (a, S,RN ) = {b ∈ A | b 6= a, b R
i a, ∀i ∈ S}
(so that P (a, S,RN ) consists of all the outcomes considered to be better than
a by all members of the coalition S), and P c(a, S,RN ) = A\P (a, S,RN ).
2.2 Local effectivity functions
In the study of game form solvability, the idea that the power of a coalition
may depend on the current state, arises naturally. This is the reason why a
local effectivity function was first introduced in Abdou (1995), but only as
an object related to a game form and an equilibrium concept (e.g. Nash or
strong Nash). In this paper we shall work with an abstract coalitional form,
where the power of coalitions depends on the current state.
Definition 2.1 A local effectivity function on (N,A) is a family E ≡ (E [U ],
U ∈ P0(A)) where for any U ∈ P0(A), E [U ] : P(N) → P(P0(A)) and such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) E [U ](S) = ∅ if and only if S = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E [U ](S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E [U ](S)
(iii) U ⊂ V ⇒ E [V ](S) ⊂ E [U ](S)
The formula B ∈ E [U ](S) is interpreted as follows: When the current state
is in U , coalition S can adapt its response in order to realize some state in
B. Let RN ∈ L(A)
N . An alternative a ∈ A is dominated at RN if there
exists U ∈ P0(A), S ∈ P0(N) such that a ∈ U and P (a, S,RN ) ∈ E [U ](S).
The core of E at RN is the set of undominated alternatives. It is denoted
C(E , RN ). E is stable if C(E , RN ) 6= ∅ for all RN ∈ L(A)
N . We introduce a
partial order on the set of all local efectivity functions on (N,A) as follows:
E  E ′ if and only if : ∀U ∈ P0(A), ∀S ∈ P0(N) : E [U ](S) ⊂ E
′[U ](S).
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Local effectivity functions that appear in the litterature satisfy some
natural properties: The first one is monotonicity w.r.t. players:
(m) ∀U ∈ P0(A), ∀S ∈ P0(N), ∀T ∈ P0(N) : S ⊂ T ⇒ E [U ](S) ⊂ E [U ](T )
The second, Possibility of Non-Action, is defined as follows:
(a) ∀U ∈ P0(A),∀S ∈ P0(N) : U ∈ E [U ](S)
The third one is the sheaf property:
(s) ∀S ∈ P0(N),∀U ∈ P0(A) : E [U ](S) = ∩a∈UE [{a}](S)
Although they may play a role in some circumstances, these properties are
not needed for the most part of this study. In the following remark we show
their impact on the core correspondence:
Remark 2.2 Let (x) be any of the properties (m), (a), (s). Given any local
effectivity function E we denote by E(x) the smallest (for ) local effectivity
function E ′ that satisfies property (x) and such that E  E ′. If we note E(xy)
the result on E of the operation (x) followed by the operation (y), it is easy to
see that that E(xx) = E(x) and E(xy) = E(yx) (x, y ∈ {m,a, s}). Moreover for
any RN ∈ L(A)
N and any x ∈ {m,a, s} one has: C(E(x), RN ) = C(E , RN ).
One can prove that given two local effectivity functions E and F , C(E , RN ) =
C(F , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N if and only if E(mas) = F (mas).
We now present some notions that appear in social choice theory and show
how they can be viewed as particular cases of local effectivity functions. The
following can be traced back to Moulin and Peleg (1982):
Definition 2.3 An effectivity function on (N,A) is a mapping E : P(N)→
P(P0(A) such that :
(i) E(S) = ∅ if and only if S = ∅,
(ii) B ∈ E(S), B ⊂ B′ ⇒ B′ ∈ E(S)
To any effectivity function E, we shall associate the local effectivity function
defined by: E [U ] = E for any U ∈ P0(A). In an effectivity function the power
of a coalitions is independent of the current state. An effectivity function is
the analog of a cooperative game with abstract payoffs.
Our second notion is a generalization of simple games as defined in Naka-
mura (1975):
Definition 2.4 A local simple game on (N,A) is a collection W = (Wa, a ∈
A) where Wa ⊂ P0(N), (a ∈ A). When Wa = W for all a ∈ A, we have a
(standard) simple game (W,A)
Wa is the set of winning coalitions at a. The interpretation of a local simple
game is as follows: if the current state is a then any coalition in Wa have
5
the power to react so that to reach any b ∈ A. For U ∈ P0(A), putW[U ] :=
∩a∈UWa. To any local simple game, we associate a local effectivity function
that reflects the same power distribution. It is defined by E [U ](S) = P0(A)
if S ∈ W[U ] and E [U ](S) = {A} if S /∈ W[U ], S 6= ∅. In a local simple game,
given some current state, a coalition is either totally powerful or totally
powerless.
The third notion comes from strategic game theory. We consider a strate-
gic game form G = 〈(Xi)i∈N , A, g〉 where Xi is the strategy set of player i,
(i ∈ N) and g :
∏
i∈N Xi → A is the outcome function. We assume that g
is onto. If S ∈ P0(N) we denote by XS the cartesian product
∏
i∈S Xi. If
xN ∈ XN we also write xN = (xS , sSc).
Definition 2.5 Let G be a strategic game form. The local effectivity func-
tion EG associated to G is defined as follows: For U ∈ P0(A), E
G[U ](∅) = ∅
and for S ∈ P0(N):
EG[U ](S) = {B ∈ P0(A)| ∀xN ∈ g
−1(U),∃yS ∈ XS : g(xSc , yS) ∈ B}
The β-effectivity function associated to G is defined by the formula: EGβ =
EG[A].
The local effectivity function associated to a strategic game form was first
introduced in Abdou (2000) in relation to strong Nash solvability. It satisfies
properties (m), (a) and (s).
3 cycles
The main tool used in the analysis of stability is the notion of cycle. In the
case of effectivity functions, it has been defined in Keiding (1985). Later
on this notion has been extended to more general structures (Abdou and
Keiding 2003).
Definition 3.1 An r- tuple ((C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)) where r ≥ 1,
Ck ∈ P0(A), Bk ∈ P0(A), Sk ∈ P0(N) (k = 1, . . . , r) is a cycle in E if :
(i) Bk ∈ E [Ck](Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r),
(ii) ∪rk=1Ck = A,
(iii) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists k ∈ J
such that for all l ∈ J : Ck ∩Bl = ∅.
(C1, . . . , Cr) is said to be the basis of the cycle and r its length. If (C1, . . . , Cr)
is a partition of A the cycle is said to be strict. E is said to be acyclic if it
has no cycle.
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Condition (i) states that at any alternative in Ck, coalition Sk can achieve
Bk, and therefore that coalition Sk would object against Ck if it were in the
interest of its members to do so. Condition (iii) is a combinatorial property
that insures that the sequence of potential objections is somehow consistent.
Condition (ii) is clear. Using the notations of definition 3.1, some immediate
consequences are in order:
1) For any cycle: Ck ∩Bk = ∅ (k = 1, . . . , r),
2) If Sk ∩ Sl = ∅, k 6= l, (k, l = 1, · · · , r) then condition (iii) amounts to
Ck ∩Bk = ∅ (k = 1, · · · , r),
3) Any cycle has length ≥ 2,
4) For any cycle: ∩rk=1Sk = ∅,
5) Any cycle of length r gives rise to a strict cycle with length ≤ r. This
can be done as follows: Put C˜1 = C1 and C˜k = Ck \ ∪
k−1
l=1 Cl (2 ≤ k ≤ r),
and remove the indices k corresponding to empty C˜k, and as a consequence:
6) Any cycle has length ≤ |A|.
Example 3.2 (a) Let E be an effectivity function. An an r- tuple ((B1, S1),
. . . , (Br, Sr)) where r ≥ 2, Sk ∈ P0(N), Bk ∈ E(Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r), Bk∩Bl =
∅ (k 6= l) and ∩rk=1Sk = ∅ gives rise to a cycle of E. We have a basis by
putting: Ck = Bk−1, k = 2, . . . , r and C1 = A \ ∪
r
k=2Ck.
(b) Let E be an effectivity function. An an r- tuple ((B1, S1), . . . , (Br, Sr))
where r ≥ 2, Sk ∈ P0(N), Bk ∈ E(Sk) (k = 1, . . . , r), Sk∩Sl = ∅ (k 6= l) and
∩rk=1Bk = ∅ gives rise to a cycle of E. By putting Ck = B
c
k (k = 1, . . . , r)
(and removing those indices k with Bck = ∅) we have a basis.
In the rest of this section we shall express the properties defining a cycle
in a few equivalent ways. In what follows, as far as we are concerned with
the combinatorial property (iii) of definition 3.1, one can point out a partial
duality between the roles of the Bk and the Ck.
Proposition 3.3 In definition 3.1 one can replace condition (iii) by either
one of the following conditions:
(iiia) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists k ∈ J
such that for all l ∈ J : Bk ∩Cl = ∅.
(iiib) For any ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅, there exists a
sequence k1, · · · , k|J | such that J = {k1, · · · , k|J |}, and [(Ck1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ckj)] ∩
[Bkj ∪ · · · ∪Bk|J|] = ∅ (j = 1, · · · , |J |).
Proof. Clearly (iiib) implies both (iii) and (iiia) : by taking k = k1 for (iii)
and k = k|J | for (iiia). Assume that (iii) is satisfied. Let ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r}
such that ∩k∈JSk 6= ∅. There exists k1 ∈ J such that Ck1 ∩ (∪l∈JBl) = ∅.
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If J \ {k1} is empty our construction is over. If not let k2 ∈ J \ {k1} such
that Ck2 ∩ (∪l∈J\{k1}Bl) = ∅. By repeating this argument, we construct:
k1, · · · , k|J | such that (iiib) is satisfied. By a dual construction starting from
(iiia) it can be proved that (iiib) is satisfied. 
A selection of P0({1, . . . , r}) is a map θ : P0({1, . . . , r}) → {1, . . . , r}
such that θ(J) ∈ J, for all J ∈ P0({1, . . . , r}). Let Σr be the set of all selec-
tions of P0({1, . . . , r}). To any (S1, . . . , Sr;A1 . . . Ar) ∈ P0(N)
r × P0(A)
r,
θ ∈ Σr and k ∈ {1, . . . , r} we associate:
J θk ≡ J
θ
k (S1, . . . , Sr) := {J ∈ P0({1, . . . , r})| ∩j∈J Sj 6= ∅, θ(J) = k}
Aθk(S1, . . . , Sr;A1 . . . Ar) := A \
⋃
J∈J θ
k
⋃
j∈J
Aj
In what follows we write Cθk for A
θ
k(S1, . . . , Sr;B1 . . . Br) and we write B
θ
k
for Aθk(S1, . . . , Sr;C1 . . . Cr).
Proposition 3.4 In definition 3.1 condition (iii) can be replaced by:
(iiic) There exists θ ∈ Σr such that Ck ⊂ C
θ
k (k = 1 · · · , r).
Proof. Straightforward. 
If E is an effectivity function, this proposition admits a more elegant for-
mulation:
Proposition 3.5 Let E be an effectivity function and let (S1, · · ·Sr;B1, · · · ,
Br) ∈ P0(N)
r × P0(A)
r such that Bk ∈ E(Sk) (k = 1, · · · , r). Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) There exists (C1, · · · , Cr) ∈ P0(A)
r such that
(
(C1, B1, S1), · · · , (Cr, Br,
Sr)
)
is a cycle of E.
(ii) There exists θ ∈ Σr such that (C
θ
1 , · · · , C
θ
r ) is a covering of A and C
θ
k 6= ∅
(k = 1, · · · , r).
Proof. Easy consequence of the preceding proposition and the remark that
for an effectivity function, the condition Bk ∈ E(Sk) replaces the condition
Bk ∈ E [Ck](Sk). 
Taking into account the partial duality between the Bk and the Ck we have
the following:
Proposition 3.6 Let E be a local effectivity function, let (C1, · · · , Cr) ∈
P0(A)
r be a covering of A and let (S1, · · · , Sr) ∈ P0(N)
r. The following are
equivalent :
(i) There exists (B1, · · · , Br) such that
(
(C1, B1, S1), · · · , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
is a
cycle of E.
(ii) There exists θ ∈ Σr such that B
θ
k ∈ E [Ck](Sk) (k = 1, · · · , r).
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Proof. (i)⇒ (ii). Assume that for some (B1, · · · , Br),
(
(C1, B1, S1), · · · , (Cr,
Br, Sr)
)
is a cycle. We define θ ∈ Σr as follows: By property (iiia) of
Proposition 3.3, we put θ(J) = k if ∩j∈JSj 6= ∅, and θ(J) ∈ J arbitrarily if
∩j∈JSj = ∅. It follows that for all J ∈ J
θ
k , Bk∩(∪j∈JCj) = ∅ or equivalently:
Bk ⊂ B
θ
k. Therefore B
θ
k ∈ E [Ck](Sk].
(ii)⇒ (i). Let θ ∈ Σr be such that (ii) is verified. Then it is easy to see that(
(C1,B
θ
1, S1), . . . , (Cr,B
θ
r , Sr)
)
is a cycle. In order to check condition (iiia)
of Proposition 3.3, let J be such that ∩j∈JSj 6= ∅ and let k := θ(J) then
J ∈ J θk so that B
θ
k ∩ (∪i∈JCj) = ∅. 
It was asserted earlier (remark 2.2) that if E is any local effectivity func-
tion and if (x) is any of the properties (m), (a), (s) then E(x) and E have the
same core correspondence. As regards cycles, we have the following :
Remark 3.7
1) E(a) and E have the same cycles,
2) To any cycle of E(m) corresponds some cycle of E with the same basis
(hence the same length), and vice versa,
3) To any cycle of E corresponds some cycle of E(s) (not necessarily with the
same length), and vice versa.
We end this section by stating the main result that justifies the intro-
duction of cycles. In the case of effectivity functions, it was first proved
by Keiding (1985) (see also Abdou and Keiding, 1991, Theorem 5.3). For
a more general result that covers the case of local effectivity functions we
refer to Abdou and Keiding (2003), Theorem 6.
Theorem 3.8 A local effectivity function E is stable if and only if it is
acyclic.
4 Instability and the stability index
This section is devoted to the study of unstable local effectivity functions.
It would be interesting to have a typology of the essential characteristics of
instability. As a first step toward this clarification, we provide an index that
sheds light on the structure of situations that generate instability. Although
cycles of the same length may be very different in structure (see example
3.2 where cycle (b) seems to be “simpler” than cycle (a)) we put forward,
as a first idea in our investigation, that this index has to do with the length
of cycles that may appear in the power distribution.
Definition 4.1 The stability index of E , denoted σ(E), is the minimal length
of a cycle in E . σ(E) is set to +∞ if E is acyclic.
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Let f : A→ A′ be a map. Let E be a local effectivity function on (N,A).
We define the image Ef of E by f as the local effectivity function on (N,A′)
where, for any U ′ ∈ P0(A
′) :
Ef [U ′](S) = {B′ ∈ P0(A
′)| f−1(B′) ∈ E [(f−1(U ′)](S)}
The r-tuple
(
(C ′1, B
′
1, S1), . . . , (C
′
r, B
′
r, Sr)
)
is a cycle of Ef if and only if((
f−1(C ′1), f
−1(B′1), S1
)
, . . . ,
(
f−1(C ′r), f
−1(B′r), Sr
))
is a cycle of E . It fol-
lows that Ef is acyclic if E is acyclic.
Conversely, let
(
(C1, B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
be a cycle of E based on the
partition (C1, . . . , Cr). Let A
′ be some set with r elements A′ := {u1, . . . , ur}
and let f : A → A′ be defined by f(a) = uk if a ∈ Uk. Put B
′
k := f(Bk)
k = 1, · · · , r. For any k, l ∈ {1, . . . , r} one has Uk ∩ Bl = ∅ if and only
if {uk} ∩ f(Bl) = ∅. It follows that ({(u1}, B
′
1, S1), . . . , ({ur}, B
′
r, Sr)) is a
cycle of Ef based on the partition ({u1}, . . . , {ur}). Therefore we have the
following characterization:
Theorem 4.2 The stability index of a local effectivity function E is the
smallest integer s for which the following property holds:
There exists a surjection f : A→ {1, · · · , s} such that Ef is unstable.
Proof. Let s be the number defined in the claim. Then for some f : A →
{1, · · · , s}, Ef has a cycle. By the first part of the above argument E has
a cycle of the same length so that : σ(E) ≤ s. By the second part of the
above argument, since there exists a cycle of length σ(E) in E , there exists a
surjection f : A→ {1, · · · , σ(E)} such that Ef is unstable, so that s ≤ σ(E).
It follows that s = σ(E). 
This characterization allows for an interpretation of the stability index.
Assume that a local effectivity function is unstable with a stability index
σ, then merging some alternatives results in a transformation of the local
effectivity function in a way that respects the power distribution. This is
the interpretation of the operation E → Ef . This transformation may occur,
for instance, when the agents cease to distinguish between two previously
distinct alternatives. If the cardinal of the new set is inferior to σ, then
the new local effectivity function is stable. If σ = 2, then instability takes a
particularly simple form: alternatives can be partitioned into two aggregates,
or two major issues, on which the society is split, and the power of coalitions
allowed by the rules is such that both issues can be opposed and neither
one can be forced. In general cycles produced by a split of the society
into disjoint coalitions, are rather simple. However when σ is high, some
configurations leading to instability may be combinatorially complex and in
order to produce them, the society must have rather sophisticated views.
The question of whether the probability (for instance when the preferences
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are assumed to be uniformly distributed) of reaching a cyclic configuration
is related to the stability index remains open and is not addressed in this
paper. However this relationship, if ever it exists, is not straightforward as
can be seen from what follows:
Remark 4.3 In view of remark 3.7, E(a), E(m) and E have the same stability
index, but not necessarily E(s). If follows that two local effectivity functions
(e.g. E and E(s)) may have the same core correspondence but different
stability indices. Indeed when E 6= E(s) some preference profile may generate
a cycle in E(s) that is shorter than any one it generates in E .
4.1 Stability Index and the Nakamura Number
In the case of simple games there is a relationship between the stability
index and the Nakamura number as defined in Nakamura (1979). This
relationship casts light on the stability index and shows that, in a sense,
the stability index may be viewed as the analog of the Nakamura number
for local effectivity functions. Let W be some set of winning coalitions.
(S1, . . . , Sr) where Sk ∈ W (k = 1 · · · , r) is a said to be a non intersecting
family of W if ∩Srk=1 = ∅. The Nakamura Number of W , denoted ν(W ),
is defined as the minimum length of a non intersecting family. If W has
no non intersecting family, then we set ν(W ) = +∞. Let W be a local
simple game on (N,A) as in definition 2.4. A 2r- tuple (U1, S1, . . . , Ur, Sr)
where Uk ∈ P0(A), Sk ∈ W[Uk] (k = 1, . . . , r) is said to be a cycle of W if
(U1, · · · , Ur) is a partition of A and ∩S
r
k=1 = ∅. The natural number r is the
length of the cycle. We recall that the local effectivity function associated
to W (resp. (W,A) ) is EW (resp. EW,A). Let σ(W) (resp. σ(W,A)) denote
the stability index σ(EW ) (resp. σ(EW,A)). One has the following:
Lemma 4.4 Any cycle of W gives rise to some strict cycle of EW of the
same length and vice versa.
Proof. Let (U1, S1, . . . , Ur, Sr) be a cycle in W. Indices are taken in Z/rZ.
Let Bk := Uk+1 (k ∈ Z/rZ). We claim that ((U1, B1, S1), . . . , (Ur, Br, Sr))
is a strict cycle of EW : In order to prove condition (iii) of definition 3.1
we remark that if J is such that ∩j∈JSj 6= ∅ then J 6= {1, · · · , r} and we
can choose any k ∈ J such that k + 1 /∈ J . Conversely any strict cycle
(U1, B1, S1, . . . , Ur, Br, Sr) in E
W is such that (U1, · · · , Ur) is a partition of
A and ∩Srk=1 = ∅. 
Corollary 4.5 For any simple game (W,A) one has :
σ(W,A) = ν(W ) if ν(W ) ≤ |A| (1)
= +∞ if ν(W ) > |A| (2)
In particular (W,A) is stable if and only if ν(W ) > |A|.
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Proof. Let ν := ν(W ) and σ := σ(W,A). If ν ≤ |A|, let (S1, · · · , Sν) be a
non intersecting family of W . Let U1, · · · , Uν be any partition of A, then
(U1, S1, . . . , Uν , Sν) is a cycle of (W,A). It follows that σ ≤ ν. Conversely
any cycle (U1, S1, . . . , Uσ, Sσ) implies that (S1, . . . , Sσ) is an intersecting
family, so that ν ≤ σ. If ν > |A| then there can be no cycle in (W,A) since
there is no partition of A of length ν. 
An alternative way to express the relationship between σ(W,A) and ν(W )
is as follows:
ν(W ) = σ(W,A) if σ(W,A) < +∞ (3)
> |A| if σ(W,A) = +∞ (4)
4.2 Stability index of Effectivity functions
It is possible to refine our knowledge of the stability index for some classes
of effectivity functions. For that purpose we recall some properties that
appear in the study of stability. As will be seen in this subsection they have
a fundamental role in the determination of the stability index. An effectivity
function E is said to be:
monotonic w.r.t. players if for all S, T ∈ P0(N),
S ⊂ T ⇒ E(S) ⊂ E(T ), (5)
regular if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 6= ∅, (6)
maximal if for all S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ P0(A),
Bc /∈ E(Sc) =⇒ B ∈ E(S), (7)
superadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∩B2 ∈ E(S1 ∪ S2), (8)
subadditive if for all S1 ∈ P0(N), S2 ∈ P0(N),
B1 ∩B2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2)⇒ B1 ∪B2 ∈ E(S1 ∩ S2). (9)
The β-Effectivity function EGβ associated to a strategic game form G (defi-
nition 2.5) satisfies monotonicity w.r.t. players and maximality. If an effec-
tivity function is subadditive then it has no cycle of type (a) of example 3.2;
it it is superadditive, then it has no cycle ot type (b). It is interesting to
note that in the case of maximal effectivity functions, the absence of such
cycles (types (a) or (b)) is equivalent to stability. The following clear cut
result that can be deduced from Abdou (1982) and Peleg (1984) (Theorem
6.A.9) is reproduced here for future use:
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Theorem 4.6 Let E be a maximal effectivity function. The following are
equivalent:
(i) E is stable,
(ii) E is superadditive and subadditive,
(iii) E has no cycles of type (a) or (b) of example 3.2.
As regards the stability index, we can establish, relying on the Theorem 4.6,
the following:
Theorem 4.7 Let E be an effectivity function. Then:
(i) σ(E) > 2 if and only if E is regular.
(ii) Assume that E is maximal. Then σ(E) ∈ {2, 3,+∞}.
Proof. (i) Let
(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
be a 2-cycle. Then S1 ∩ S2 =
∅, C1 ∪ C2 = A, Bi ∈ E(Si), Bi ⊂ C
c
i (i = 1, 2), so that B1 ∩ B2 ⊂
Cc1 ∩ C
c
2 = ∅. This contradicts regularity. Conversely if ((S1, B1), (S2, B2))
is such that Bi ∈ E(Si) (i = 1, 2), S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and B1 ∩ B2 = ∅ then
((Bc1, B1, S1), (B
c
2, B2, S2)) is 2-cycle.
(ii) In view of Theorem 4.6, a maximal effectivity function is stable if and
only if it is subadditive and superadditive. In that case σ(E) = +∞. If E
is not superadditive then there exists S1, S2 ∈ P0(N), B1, B2 ∈ P0(A) such
that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, B1 ∈ E(S1), B2 ∈ E(S2) and B1 ∩ B2 /∈ E(S1 ∪ S2).
Put S3 = (S1 ∪ S2)
c, B3 = (B1 ∩ B2)
c. By maximality B3 ∈ E(S3) so that(
(Bc1, B1, S1), (B
c
2, B2, S2), (B
c
3, B3, S3)
)
is a cycle. A similar proof can be
done if E is not subadditive. Therefore σ(E) ≤ 3. 
4.3 Stability Index of Local Effectivity Functions
In order to obtain some precise indications on the stability index of a local
effectivity function, we shall define some simpler objects that it induces and
that play a role in its stability. In his study of strong Nash solvability, to-
gether with the local effectivity functions associated to a game form, Abdou
(1995) introduced a property called exactness. The latter generalizes “exact
maximality, a property found in Li (1991). Here we extend this definition to
general local effectivity functions. Starting from a local effectivity function
E we define two simpler objets:
The global effectivity function derived from E is the mapping E0 : P(N) →
P(P0(A)) such that all S ∈ P(N): E0(S) := E [A](S).
The exact effectivity function derived from E is the mapping Eξ : P(N) →
P(P0(A)) such that Eξ(∅) = ∅ and for S ∈ P0(S), by:
Eξ(S) := {B ∈ P0(A) | B = A or ∃a /∈ B,B ∈ E [{a}](S)} (10)
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Note that properties (i) and (ii) of definition 2.3 are satisfied by E0, whereas
Eξ does not necessarily satisfy property (ii) (monotonicity w.r.t. alterna-
tives) so that it is not an “effectivity function”. In general it is clear from
the definitions that for all S ∈ P0(N), E0(S) ⊂ Eξ(S).
Definition 4.8 A local effectivity function E is said to be exact if E0 = Eξ.
A local effectivity function E is said to be maximal if E0 is maximal.
Note that the exactness property conveys some information only in the
framework of local effectivity function. In the case of effectivity functions,
that is, in the case where E is independent of U , it is always true that
E0 = Eξ = E [U ] (for any U ∈ P0(N)). Exactness together with max-
imality will shed light on the structure of local effectivity functions with
respect to the stability/instability problem. In what follows we investigate
the impact of exactness on the core correspondence and cycles of E . Clearly
C(E , RN ) ⊂ C(E0, RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N and any cycle of E0 is a cycle
of E . In addition on has:
Proposition 4.9 If E is exact, then:
(i) C(E0, RN ) = C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N ,
(ii) E and E0 have the same cycles.
Proof. If a is dominated in E at RN , then for some S ∈ P0(N), P (a, S,RN ) ∈
E [{a}](S). Since a /∈ P (a, S,RN ), one has P (a, S,RN ) ∈ Eξ(S) = E0(S) so
that a is dominated in E0. Likewise if the r-tuple
(
(C1B1, S1), . . . , (Cr, Br, Sr)
)
is a cycle in E , then in particular Ck ∩ Bk = ∅, Ck 6= ∅ and since Bk ∈
E [Ck](Sk) it follows that Bk ∈ Eξ(Sk) = E0(Sk), so that this r-tuple is also
a cycle in E0. 
Lemma 4.10 Assume that E is maximal and not exact. Then:
(i) there exists RN ∈ L(A)
N such that C(E , RN ) = ∅ and if further E0 is
monotonic w.r.t. players we have in addition |C(E0, RN )| = 1.
(ii) there exists a cycle of length at most 3 in E, that is not a cycle in E0.
Proof. (i) Let S ∈ P0(N), B ∈ P0(N) such that B ∈ Eξ(S) and B /∈ E0(S).
Then there exists a ∈ Bc such that B ∈ E [{a}](S) and Bc ∈ E0(S
c). Define
a profile RN such that: for i ∈ S, B R
i {a} Ri Bc \ {a} and for i ∈ Sc,
{a} Ri Bc \ {a} Ri B. If b ∈ B then P (b, Sc, RN ) ⊃ B
c ∈ E0(S
c), so that b
is dominated in E0. If b ∈ B \ {a}, then P (b,N,RN ) ⊃ {a}. By maximality
of E0, E0(N) = P0(A), so that b is dominated in E0. Therefore one has
C(E0, RN ) ⊂ {a}. Now P (a, S,RN ) = B ∈ E [{a}](S) implies that a is
dominated in E , and since C(E , RN ) ⊂ C(E0, RN ) we have C(E , RN ) = ∅.
If moreover E0 is monotonic w.r.t. players , then for T ∈ P0(N), T ⊂ S we
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have P (a, T,RN ) = B /∈ E0(T ) and for T ∩S
c 6= ∅ we have P (a, T,RN ) = ∅
so that a is not dominated in E0. We conclude that C(E0, RN ) = {a}.
(ii) Put S1 = S, S2 = S
c, S3 = N , B1 = B,B2 = B
c, B3 = {a}, C1 =
{a}, C2 = B,C3 = B
c \ {a}. In E this defines a 3-cycle if C3 6= ∅, and a
2-cycle if C3 = ∅, that is not a cycle in E0.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.10 we have the following propo-
sition that provides, when E0 is maximal, a partial converse to Proposition
4.9:
Proposition 4.11 Assume that E is maximal.
(i) If E0 is monotonic w.r.t. players then E is exact if and only if C(E0, RN ) =
C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
(ii) E is exact if and only if E0 and E have the same cycles.
In what follows, we summarize the main results concerning stability of local
effectivity functions. This can be viewed as a generalization to the local
effectivity functions, of Theorem 3.11 of Abdou (2000) where only objects
derived from a game form were considered:
Theorem 4.12 Assume that E is maximal. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
(i) E is stable
(ii) E is exact and E0 is stable.
(iii) E is exact and E0 is superadditive and subadditive.
Moreover in that case C(E0, RN ) = C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N .
Proof. If E is stable then E0 is stable and by the first part of assertion
(i) of Lemma 4.10, E is exact. Conversely if E is exact, then C(E0, RN ) =
C(E , RN ) for all RN ∈ L(A)
N by Lemma 4.9 assertion (i), and if moreover
E0 is stable it follows that E is stable. This estabilshes the equivalence
between (i) and (ii). The equivalence with (iii) follows from Theorem 4.6.

As regards instability one can obtain precise indications on the index.
For that purpose we assert the following:
Theorem 4.13 (i) σ(E) = 2 if E0 is not regular.
(ii) Assume that E is maximal. Then σ(E) ∈ {2, 3,+∞}
Proof. If E0 is not regular then 2 ≤ σ(E) ≤ σ(E0) = 2, we conclude that
σ(E) = 2. Assume that E0 is maximal and E not stable. Two cases are
possible. In the first case E0 is stable, then by Theorem 4.12 E is not
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exact and by Lemma 4.10 assertion (ii) E has a cycle of length ≤ 3, so that
σ(E) ≤ 3. In the second case E0 is not stable then by Theorem 4.7 σ(E0) ≤ 3
and since σ(E) ≤ σ(E0) we conclude again that σ(E) ≤ 3. 
Remark 4.14 If E satisfies the non-action property (a) and the sheaf prop-
erty (s) (see subsection 2.2 and remark 4.3) then (i) in 4.13 can be im-
proved to read as follows: σ(E) = 2 if and only if E0 is not regular: If(
(C1, B1, S1), (C2, B2, S2)
)
is a 2-cycle, then C1 ∪ C2 = A, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅,
C1 ⊂ B
c
1 and C2 ⊂ B
c
2, B1 ∈ E [C1](S1), B2 ∈ E [C2](S2). It follows that
Cc1 ∈ E [C1](S1) and C
c
2 ∈ E [C2](S2) and in view of properties (a) and (s),
Cc1 ∈ E [A](S1) and C
c
2 ∈ E [A](S2). Since E [A] = E0, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and
Cc1 ∩ C
c
2 = ∅ we deduce that E0 is not regular.
5 Conclusion
We defined a stability index for local effectivity functions and showed its
connection to the Nakamura Number of simple games. We proved that for
any unstable maximal local effectivity function that induces a the index is
either 2 or 3. Our results constitute a first step in the comprehension of the
nature of instability. It would be interesting to compute the stability index
of neutral and anonymous effectivity functions: this is a challenging com-
binatorial exercice. The same definition of stability index may be extended
to more general interaction forms, especially to those derived from strategic
game forms. The study of their stability index would give an insight into
the nature of instability involved in the underlying equilibrium concept.
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